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HOLDING CLERGY ACCOUNTABLE: MARYLAND SHOULD 
REQUIRE CLERGY TO REPORT SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Catholic Church alone, 700 clergy have been removed from 
ministry since June 2002 due to the surfacing of child sexual abuse 
claims. 1 Cardinal William Keeler disclosed in 2002 that allegedly 
more than eighty priests in the Baltimore Archdiocese have sexually 
abused minors in the past. 2 Reports of sexual abuse have been uncov-
ered outside the Catholic Church as well. A Presbyterian missionary is 
suspected of abusing twenty-two women and girls,3 while an Orthodox 
Jewish youth leader is accused of dozens of cases of molestation of 
teenage girls and boys.4 
In many instances, colleagues of abusive clergy fail to report sus-
pected abuse to the appropriate authorities.5 Some claim that relig-
ious organizations conspire to keep the abuse secret. In Boston, 
Catholic priest John J. Geoghan allegedly sexually abused 130 chil-
dren.6 The Boston Archdiocese, aware of the abuse, chose to keep 
the matter within the Church.7 Cardinals and bishops merely moved 
Geoghan from parish to parish for thirty-four years, while he contin-
ued to molest children.8 These same leaders also discouraged victims 
of the abuse from reporting it to authorities.9 
Similar collusion has occurred elsewhere. In Jehovah's Witness 
churches, leaders handle complaints of sexual abuse solely within the 
church. 10 An all-male group of elders meets to decide how to proceed 
with each complaint, and refuses to pursue the matter unless a witness 
1. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 700 Priests Removed 
Since January 2002 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.usccb.org/ 
comm/ archives/2004/04-040.h tm. 
2. John Rivera, Keeler Letter Reveals Abuse, BALT. SUN, Sept. 25, 2002, at IA. 
3. Kevin Eckstrom, Presbyterian Church Mulls New Rules in Sex Abuse Cases, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at B9. 
4. Alan Cooperman, Sexual Abuse Scandal Hits OrthodoxJews, WASH. POST,June 
29, 2002, at A2. 
5. Mark Henry, Confession of Crime Leads to a Dilemma for the Clergy, L.A. TIMES, 
June 1, 1986, pt. 2, at 4. 
6. Michael Rezendez, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 6, 2002, at AI. 
7. See id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See Laurie Goodstein, Ousted Members Say Jehovah's Witnesses' Policy on Abuse 
Hides Offenses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 1, at 26; see also Dennis O'Brien, 
Another Church Facing Charges of Sexual Abuse, BALT. SUN, May 21,2002, at lB. 
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can corroborate the victim's storyY Victims are threatened with "dis-
fellowshiping," or expulsion from the church, if they consider report-
ing the abuse themselves. I2 Because neither the church nor the 
victims report the abuse outside the church, it is usually allowed to 
continue. I3 
Although abusive clergy have received much of the public atten-
tion, members of religious congregations have also sexually abused 
children. I4 Some cases demonstrate that clergy have been reluctant 
to report suspected abuse in those circumstances as well. I5 Further-
more, while the media has focused on the failure of clergy to report 
sexual child abuse, evidence exists that suggests physical and emo-
tional child abuse in religious institutions has also gone unreported. I6 
While some churches are adopting new policies outlining how they 
will deal with abusive clergy within the church,17 the states must pass 
laws holding abusive and secretive clergy accountable to society. Al-
lowing churches to form their own policies and handle allegations of 
sexual abuse solely within their organizations is inadequate. A recent 
study showed that, of nearly 11,000 allegations of child sexual abuse in 
the Catholic Church, 149 priests accounted for twenty-six percent of 
the allegations. I8 That statistic means that a group of 149 priests was 
responsible for 2,860 allegations, or that each priest in the group was 
to blame for an average of approximately nineteen allegations. If 
other church leaders were aware of those priests' actions, and those 
leaders were required to make a report at first suspicion, much of the 
subsequent abuse could have been avoided. 
11. See Goodstein, supra note 10, at 26. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 764 
P.2d 759, 760-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see also Henry, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 
4. 
15. See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 764 P.2d at 762. In that case, a 
member of the church's congregation molested children for twenty years 
while church leaders, fully aware of the 'abuse, did nothing to stop it. [d. at 
761-62. 
16. See, e.g., Martin Finucane, Former Students Allege Rape, Abuse at Schoolfor Deaf, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2004, available at http://www.smccarthy.com/arch 
ives/0504/now_the_nuns_are_involved.php (reporting that, in a recent 
suit brought against nuns, priests, and other leaders at a religious school, 
former students claimed they were beaten, sexually molested, and emotion-
ally traumatized by nuns). 
17. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the 
Protection of Children and Young People, Revised Edition (Nov. 2002), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm. 
18. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY 
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH STUDY 
CONDUCTED BY THE JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ix-x (Feb. 27, 
2004), available at http://wwwJiay.cuny.edu/ churchstudy /main.asp [here-
inafter JOHN JAY STUDY]. 
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Child molesters should not be able to hide behind the veil of se-
crecy created by their religious institutions, allowing them to repeat-
edly abuse their victims. Nationally, sexual child abuse is one of the 
most underreported crimes.19 Moreover, according to a representa-
tive of Maryland's Child Protective Services, Maryland underreports as 
compared to the rest of the country.20 By mandating that clergy re-
port, Maryland could increase its reporting rate. 21 For this reason, 
clergy must be held to the same standard as every other individual in 
Maryland; they must be required to report suspected child abuse to 
the authorities.22 
As a general matter, Maryland law requires all persons to report 
suspected sexual, physical, and emotional child abuse.23 The law, 
however, provides two exceptions: (1) attorneys who learn of the 
abuse from their clients during confidential, privileged communica-
tions; and (2) clergy who learn of the abuse during certain confiden-
tial communications.24 In 2003, some Maryland legislators introduced 
Senate Bill 412, a bill that would have narrowed the clergy exception 
by requiring clergy to report abuse disclosed to them by victims or 
their family members, even if the disclosure was made during a con-
fession or similar practice.25 Although the bill provided an exemption 
for confessions made by the perpetrator of the crime,26 some mem-
bers of the religious community were outraged.27 Many believed the 
bill would violate the "Seal of the Confessional"28 and offend the tradi-
tional privilege that allows clergy to keep certain communications 
19. 
20. 
See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OFTuSTICE, NCJ 163390, CHILD 
SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES 1 (1997), available at http://www. 
ncj rs.org/ pdffiles/ 163390. pdf. 
See Testimony of Dale Balfour before the House Judiciary Committee on 
HB 1490 (bill creating the clergy exemption to the child abuse reporting 
statute) (on file with author). In 2003, only 1,279 "indicated" instances of 
child abuse, or those where credible evidence was not refuted, were re-
ported in Maryland. MD. DEP'T OF HUMAN REs., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS., 
FACTS AND STATISTICS (2004), available at http://www.dhr.state.md.us/cps/ 
statdata.htm. 
21. See Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will it Save Our Children?, 28 
SETON HALL L. REv. 963, 967 (1998) (discussing the correlation between 
requiring professionals to report abuse and increasing numbers of reports). 
22. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (1) (i) (2004). Seediscussion infra Part 
III.B. 
23. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a)(1) (i). 
24. Id. at § 5-705 (a) (2)-(3). 
25. See S. 412, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003); H.D. 823, 2003 Leg., 417th 
Sess. (Md. 2003). The two versions of the bill are identical. For the text of 
the bill, see infra Part IVA. 
26. SeeS. 412, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003). 
27. Jo Becker, McCarrick Decries Maryland Child Abuse Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 
2003, at B1. Cardinal Theodore McCarrick is the leader of the Archdiocese 
of Washington. Id. 
28. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
340 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
confidentia1.29 The Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings ulti-
mately gave the bill an unfavorable report.30 
In 2004, a revised version of the bill was introduced in both the 
Senate and House of Delegates.31 The new bill would have required 
clergy to report child abuse only if they were acting outside their cleri-
cal role when they learned of the abuse, if they learned of it through 
non-confidential communications or observations, or if they disclosed 
the abuse to a third party.32 Confessions and similar practices would 
still have been exempted from the reporting requirement.33 This bill 
also failed in committee in the Maryland Senate.34 
This comment discusses the history of clergy-communicant privi-
leges and child abuse reporting statutes, and their treatment in juris-
dictions outside Maryland.35 The comment then discusses Maryland 
law in those areas.36 Next, it recommends passage of a law similar to 
Senate Bill 412,37 and evaluates possible constitutional challenges to 
such a law.38 Finally, this comment recommends the adoption of 
other laws that are needed in Maryland to hold clergy fully accounta-
ble to children and society.39 
II. BACKGROUND AND TREATMENT BY OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
A. The Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
Most religious organizations require that clergy keep certain com-
munications with members confidentia1.40 Many of the states protect 
this confidentiality by recognition of the "priest-penitent" or "clergy-
communicant" privilege, which generally allows clergy to refuse to tes-
29. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003); discussion infra Part 
II.A. 
30. Jo Becker, Maryland Panel Rejects Child Abuse Bill After Uproar, WASH. POST, 
March 1, 2003, at B3. 
31. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth 
Sess. (Md. 2004). The two versions of the bill are identical. For the text of 
the bill, see infra Part IV.A. 
32. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth 
Sess. (Md. 2004). 
33. See S. 237, 2004 Leg., 41Sth Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 109S, 2004 Leg., 41Sth 
Sess. (Md. 2004). 
34. See Joe Feuerherd, Maryland Committees Reject Clergy Reporting Bill, NAT'L 
CATH. REp., Washington Notebook, Mar. 24, 2004, available at http://www. 
nationalcatholicreporter.org/washington/wnb032404.htm. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. See infra Part III. 
37. See infra Part IV. 
3S. See infra Part V. 
39. See infra Part VI. 
40. For a discussion of the confidentiality of the Catholic confessional, see 
Anthony Merlino, Comment, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confes-
sional from Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 655 
(2002). 
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tifY at trial as to certain communications with those confiding in 
themY In many jurisdictions, however, the privilege is a broader 
rule, extending to all in-court testimony, including grand jury pro-
ceedings and administrative hearings.42 
The privilege first arose in English courts to protect communica-
tions made during confession,43 also known as the Roman Catholic 
Sacrament of Penance or Sacrament of Reconciliation.44 The Roman 
Catholic Church mandates confession so that priests may absolve con-
fessors of their sins.45 The first American case on this subject, based 
on the constitutional grounds of free exercise of religion, allowed a 
Roman Catholic priest to refuse to testifY regarding confessional com-
munications.46 All fifty states later created court rules or statutes ex-
panding the privilege to include communications made to clergy of all 
religions.47 Policy reasons supporting these laws included society's in-
41. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements 
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REv. 723, 
740-42 (1987). 
42. Id. at 787; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 2004) (ex-
tending privilege to "any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary 
thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding"); In re Grand 
Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 378-79, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the application of clergymen's 
privilege to grand jury proceedings). 
43. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 736. 
44. Merlino, supra note 40, at 658. The seal of the confessional is considered 
"inviolable" and priests face severe punishment by the church if broken. Id. 
at 663-64. This tenet is found in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church. 
1983 CODE c.983-84. 
45. Merlino, supra note 40, at 658-59. 
46. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sess. (1813). In this case, a Roman Cath-
olic priest refused to testifY regarding who had given him stolen goods to 
return to their owner. Id. The case was never officially published, but is 
reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAw. 199 
(1955). 
47. See ALA. R. EVID. 505(b); ALAsKA R. EVID. 506(b); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (West 2003); ARK. R. EVID. 505(b); CAL. EVID. CODE 
§§ 1032- 1033 (West 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (West 
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 2004); DEL. R. EVID. 505(b); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2004); 
HAw. R. EVID. 506(b); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Michie 2004); 735 ILL. 
COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1(3) 
(West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.lO(1) (West 1999); RAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-429(b) (2005); Ky. R. EVID. 505(b); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (B) 
(West 2005); ME. R. EVID. 505(b); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-
III (2003); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 2000); MICH. 
COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (WEST 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(c) 
(West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(2) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 491.060(4) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003); NEB. REv. 
STAT. § 27-506(2) (2004); NEV. REv. STAT. 49.255 (2002); N.H. R. EVID. 505; 
NJ. R. EVID. 511; N.M. R. EVID. Il-506(B); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAw § 4505 (Con-
sol. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2003); N.D. R. EVID. 505(b); OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (West 2004); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 2505(B) (West 2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260(2) (2003); 42 PA. CONS. 
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terest in fostering confidential relationships, the individual's right to 
privacy, and the free exercise of religion. 48 Most religious groups be-
lieve that confidential counseling encourages people to openly re-
pent, receive forgiveness and guidance, and presumably lead a more 
blameless life.49 The scope of protected communications, however, 
varies by jurisdiction. 
Ten states recognize a privilege only for "confessions,"5o while the 
others recognize a broader privilege for all "spiritual advice" or other 
confidential communications. 51 Many of these rules and statutes are 
ambiguous, however, leaving courts to determine whether they re-
quire the clergy or the confider to be acting under religious compul-
sion when the communication occurs. 52 For instance, several laws 
describe protected communications with the following antiquated lan-
guage originally found in People v. Phillips and the subsequendy en-
acted New York statute:53 "confessions made ... in the course of 
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. "54 The term 
"confessions" literally means the acknowledgement of one's miscon-
STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-17-23 (2004); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-13-17 (Michie 
2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(a)(1) (2000); TEX. R. EVlD. 505(b); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (2002); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 5.60.060(3) (West 2004); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-301 (a) (Michie 2004); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06(2) (West 2004); WYO .. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (a) (ii) 
(Michie 2003). Federal courts will follow the state law of privileges in ~Tie 
cases, FED. R. EVlD. 501, but they also recognize the common law privilege 
for matters offederallaw. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) 
(dictum) (noting that "[t]he priest-penitent privilege recognizes the 
human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confi-
dence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive 
priestly consolation and guidance in return"). 
48. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 761. 
49. See, e.g., Merlino, supra note 40, at 658-59. This reasoning may be somewhat 
flawed in the case of child abusers because many of them suffer from a 
chronic disorder and cannot be cured. See Christine H. Kim, Putting Reason 
Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 
1999 ILL. L. REv. 287, 294 n.59 (1999). 
50. See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant 
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REv. 
1127, 1134 (2003). These states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Michigan, 
Montana, Nevada, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at n.34. 
51. Id. at 1133-34. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at nn.31-33. 
52. See id. at 1136-38. 
53. See N.Y. C.P.L.R 4505 (Consol. 2004); Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 
supra note 46, at 213. 
54. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003). 
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duct, 55 but also refers to the disclosure of sins to a priest or minister in 
order to receive absolution.56 The phrase "in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church" suggests the confession must be a ritual that 
the church requires its members practice, such as the Roman Catholic 
Sacrament of Penance.57 Because these laws extend to clergy of all 
religions,58 however, and most churches do not require confession, 
the privilege must necessarily include even those confessions that the 
church does not require.59 
B. The Clergy Abuse Reporting Statutes 
While the clergy-communicant privilege protects clergy against 
compelled testimony, all fIfty states have some form of child abuse 







See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1993). 
Webster's defines "confession" as "the act of confessing: admission: a state-
ment of guilt or obligation in a matter pertaining to one's self." Id. 
See id. (alternatively defining "confession" as "acknowledgement of sins or 
sinfulness; specific [ally]: the act of disclosing sins or faults to a priest to 
obtain sacramental absolution or to a minister to obtain pastoral 
counseling") . 
Webster's defines "enjoin" as "[t]o direct, prescribe, or impose by order 
typically authoritatively and compellingly and with urgent admonition." Id. 
at 754. See also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 748 (observing that "[b]ecause most churches 
do not set aside formal occasions for special private encounters labeled 
'confession,' less formal consultation must be privileged if the privilege is 
not in effect to be limited to Roman Catholics"). Also of concern is that, in 
the Roman Catholic Church itself, it can sometimes be difficult to distin-
guish confessional or penitential communications from other types of com-
munication. Mitchell notes that" [a] typical counseling session will be an 
unpredictable, often emotional, welter of several types of communication. 
It is practically impossible to untangle the various strands of communica-
tion and make only some privileged." Mitchell, supra note 41, at 749. 
See ALA. CODE § 2~14-3 (Supp. 2004); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie 
2004); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-507 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11165.9 (West Supp. 
2005); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 
(2004); HAw. REv. STAT. § 350-1.1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 1~1619 (Michie 
2001); 325 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-
5-1 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (2000); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 
(Supp. 2003); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 603 (West Supp. 2005); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 4011-A (West Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (Supp. 
2004); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2003); MICH. CaMP. 
LAws ANN. § 722.623 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 626.556 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1999); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 210.115 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2003); NEB. 
REv. STAT. § 28-711 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 202.882 (Michie 2001); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2001); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:~.10 (WEST 
2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2004); N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAw § 413 
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of the state to report suspected child abuse to the appropriate authori-
ties. 61 The problem with such a requirement is that the language of 
some clergy-communicant privileges is broad enough to preclude 
clergy from being required to report child abuse.62 
For example, Pennsylvania's statute states that a clergyman shall not 
be compelled to disclose confidential information "in any legal pro-
ceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit. "63 Illinois' 
statute protects certain information from disclosure "in any court, or 
to any administrative board or agency, or to any public officer."64 
Both of these privileges seem to extend beyond testimony given at 
trial to any statement provided to law enforcement authorities. 
Furthermore, some of the rationale supporting the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege seems to apply in the context of child abuse report-
ing.65 Those communicating with the clergy may fear disclosure to 
law enforcement authorities, just as they would disclosure in a formal 
court proceeding.66 One might argue that requiring clergy to report 
suspected child abuse would discourage open communication or im-
pede the free exercise of religion.67 Clergy may, therefore, interpret 
the clergy-communicant privilege to exempt them from the require-
ment to report child abuse.68 
Because the clergy-communicant privilege may extend to the re-
porting of child abuse, these statutes create a tension between the 
clergy's need to keep certain communications confidential and their 
(McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1-03 (1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2004); OKlA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West Supp. 2005); OR. REv. STAT. § 419B.010 (2003); 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001); RI. GEN. LAws § 40-11-3 (1997); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-
8A-3 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 
(2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1509 (Michie 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 1997); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Michie Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 
(West 2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2003). 
61. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1138-39. These statutes usually cover all forms 
of child abuse, including physical, mental, and sexual abuse; a report 
should generally be made to the Department of Social Services or its 
equivalent, or the local law enforcement agency. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-
14-3(b) (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(d) (West 2004); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (b) (3) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510(d) (Law. Co-
op.2004). 
62. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1139-41. See also supra note 42 and accompa-
nying text. 
63. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 2004). 
64. 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/8-803 (2003). 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
66. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1156. 
67. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 789-90. 
68. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 793-94. 
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duty to help prevent child abuse.69 Many states have addressed this 
tension by requiring clergy to report suspected child abuse, unless the 
communication meets certain criteria. 70 Some of these state laws spe-
cifically exempt privileged information from the reporting require-
ment. 71 Others make no mention of the privilege whatsoever. 72 If, in 
those state laws that do not mention the clergy-communicant privi-
lege, the privilege is interpreted to extend beyond in-court testimony, 
the clergy's duty to report may be limited by that state's privilege.73 
Six states-New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, and West Virginia-specifically abrogate any clergy-com-
municant privilege in the context of child abuse reporting.74 These 
states use differing language to accomplish this result. For example, 
New Hampshire's statute specifically lists priests, ministers, and rabbis 
as mandatory reporters, and an annotation to the statute states, "this 
obligation is not limited by religious exemption."75 North Carolina 
takes a different approach by stating in one section of its code that 
"any person" must report suspected abuse,76 and stating in another 
section that privileges are not grounds for failing to report. 77 Impor-
tantly, in all but two of these states, the reporting requirement does 











See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 723. 
See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 728-29. Some states require clergy to report 
by specifically listing clergy as mandatory reporters, while other states in-
clude "any person" in their list. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1138. Fifteen 
states do not require clergy to report under any circumstances. See Abrams, 
supra note 49, at 1139. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Abrams, supra note 50, 
at 1139 n.55. 
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1139. These states are Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See Abrams, supra 
note 49, at 1139 n.58. 
See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1140. These states are Connecticut, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See Abrams, 
supra note 50, at 1140 n.60. 
See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301, 7B-310 
(2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAws 
§ 40-11-3,40-11-11 (Supp. 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 
2004); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Michie 2004). 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301. 
[d. at § 7B-310. 
North Carolina and Texas are the two states that allow a defendant's con-
fession of child abuse to his clergyman to be used during a criminal trial. 
[d.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.202 (Vernon 2004). The Court of Appeals 
of Texas, without addressing constitutionality, has upheld convictions 
where this evidence was admitted. See Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63, 68 
(Tex. App. 2001); Martinez v. State, 2002 Tex. App. LEX IS 5975, at *3 
(Aug. 15, 2002). 
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These six state legislatures passed laws requiring clergy to report in 
recognition of the need to protect the safety and welfare of children. 79 
This is not to say that mandatory reporting laws do not have disadvan-
tages. Some argue that requiring clergy to break confidences when 
they learn of child abuse will discourage congregation members or 
colleagues from confiding in them at all.80 Also, clergy may be forced 
to choose between violating the law of the state and violating the law 
of their religious institutions, placing them in a difficult situation.81 
Nevertheless, six states have weighed these competing interests and 
determined that a child's safety should take priority.82 
III. MARYLAND LAW 
A. The Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
Maryland recognizes a very broad clergy-communicant privilege.83 
It protects any communication made in confidence to a clergyman by 
a person seeking "spiritual advice or consolation."84 This broad privi-
lege is intended to encourage people to seek assistance when they are 
experiencing problems, so that they can discuss them openly and po-
tentially resolve them.8S By allowing clergy to refuse to testifY in court 
as to confidential communications, the privilege permits church mem-
bers to speak with their clergy without fear of subsequent disclosure.86 
There is no Maryland law, however, that extends the privilege beyond 
testimony in court and administrative proceedings.87 
79. Shannon O'Malley, At All Costs: Mandatory Child Abuse Repmting Statutes and 
the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 21 REv. LITIG. 701, 713 (2002). 
80. Id. at 711. But see supra notes 18 and 49. 
81. See O'Malley, supra note 79, at 711. 
82. But see id. at 718. The author recognizes that 
Id. 
there apparently have been no reported conVIctlons of 
clergymembers in Texas for refusing to report or testify. This ob-
servation leads to the conclusion that law enforcers and prosecu-
tors are ignoring . . . the Texas Family Code by allowing the 
clergymembers to keep silent about any knowledge of child abuse 
learned in the confessional. 
83. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003). 
84. Id. The statute reads: "A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an 
established church of any denomination may not be compelled to testify on 
any matter in relation to any confession or communication made to him in 
confidence by a person seeking his spiritual advice or consolation." Id. 
There have been no reported cases in Maryland interpreting the scope of 
this privilege. See id. (there are no annotations interpreting the scope of 
the statute). 
85. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 762, 768. 
86. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 762. 
87. The privilege applies to all in-court testimony, whether at trial or some 
other proceeding; however, because the statute uses the term "testify," the 
privilege does not cover a clergyman's confidential disclosure of informa-
tion outside of court. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003). 
BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 1514 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "testify" as "to give 
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B. The Child Abuse Reporting Statutes 
Since 1987, the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code has specif-
ically required all health practitioners, police officers, educators, and 
human service workers to report all suspected instances of child sex-
ual abuse to the local department or law enforcement agency.88 The 
section further mandates that any other "person" in the state report 
such suspicions.89 In 1988, this section of the statute was amended to 
provide an exemption for certain communications.9o Subsection 
(a) (2) excludes attorneys from the reporting requirement if such a 
report would violate the attorney-client privilege.91 Subsection (a) (3) 
provides that clergy will not be required to disclose information pro-
tected by the clergy-communicant privilege, if that information was 
communicated to the clergyman "in a professional character in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the church," and the clergyman is 
"bound to maintain the confidentiality of that communication under 
canon law, church doctrine, or practice."92 
The language of subsection (a) (3) is vague regarding what informa-
tion clergy are not obligated to divulge to the authorities. Clearly, 
Maryland's clergy-communicant privilege protects any communica-
tion made in confidence to a clergyman by a person seeking "spiritual 
advice or consolation."93 On the other hand, the clergy reporting ex-
emption should not be as broad as the testimonial privilege because 
reporting involves the health and welfare of children that will con-








evidence as a witness"). Black's definition does not include confidential 
reports of child abuse to a department of social services. See also infra note 
116. 
1987 Md. Laws 635 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-704 (a) (l)(i) 
(2004». Abuse is defined in the subtitle as "the physical or mental injury 
of a child ... or the sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are 
sustained or not." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701 (b) (1)-(2). The local 
department to which the report should be made is the department of social 
services that has jurisdiction in the county where the child lives or the 
abuse occurred. [d. § 5-701(0)(1)-(2). 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705(a) (l)(i). 
1988 Md. Laws 769, 770. 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (2) (2004). The attorney-client privi-
lege is found in section 9-108 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (2003). 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (3) (2004). Interestingly, the 1988 
bill, as introduced, included only an exemption for the attorney-client privi-
lege. See 1988 Md. Laws at 770. The exemption for the clergy-communi-
cant privilege was added to the bill as an amendment, without a committee 
hearing at which the public could testifY. See id. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003). 
The "legislative policy" of the subtitle specifically notes that the reporting 
requirements are intended "to protect children who have been the subject 
of abuse or neglect." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-702 (1999). In a recent 
letter to Senator Delores G. Kelley, the chief sponsor of Senate Bill 412, 
Kathryn Rowe, an Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, pointed out that 
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reporting statute, however, seems to exempt a very broad category of 
communications. The phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by 
the church" could simply refer to a counseling session that the church 
encourages, or the confidentiality of which the church generally guar-
antees.95 Furthermore, the clergyman need only be "bound to main-
tain the confidentiality of [the] communication under canon law, 
church doctrine, or practice."96 Some churches, or even individual 
clergymen, might customarily keep certain communications confiden-
tial, and interpret this "practice" as one that exempts clergy from the 
duty to report child abuse. 
Indeed, in a letter written to a Maryland legislator in support of the 
current clergy exemption, the Executive Director of the Maryland 
Catholic Conference pointed out that the exemption "relates only to 
knowledge obtained during a conversation in which the clergyman 
serves as spiritual advisor to a person who specifically manifests the 
need for spiritual advice and guidance and which, but for the curtain 
of assured confidentiality, would not likely OCCUr."97 In other words, 
that Catholic leader interpreted the exemption to include all commu-
nication protected by the clergy-communicant privilege. His interpre-
tation is understandable given the confusing language of the statute.98 
An advisory opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland provides 
no clarification. In response to an inquiry from the Governor's Coun-
cil on Child Abuse and Neglect, the Attorney General simply stated 
that the statute "excuses reporting of certain confidential communica-
the current statute was probably intended to cover a very narrow class of 
penitential communications - those where a religious requirement to com-
municate is placed on the confider. See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Ma-
ryland Assistant Attorney General, to Maryland Senator Delores G. Kelley 
Gan. 20, 2004) (on file with author). 
95. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (observing that the phrase "in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the church" may refer to more than 
only those confessions required by the church); see also Mitchell, supra note 
41, at 754-55. 
96. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (a) (3) (ii) (2004) (emphasis added). 
97. Letter from Richard J. Dowling, Executive Director, Maryland Catholic 
Conference, to Senator Walter M. Baker, Chairman of the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee (Apr. 5, 1988), microfarmed on 276/C-305 (Md. 
Dep't of Legis. Reference). In another letter, he referred to the amend-
ment as one "designed to reinstate the priest-penitent privilege" in the 
child abuse reporting context. Letter from Richard J. Dowling, Executive 
Director, Maryland Catholic Conference, to Senator Nathan C. Irby (Mar. 
7,1988), microfarmed on 276/C-312 (Md. Dep't of Legis. Reference). Schol-
ars have also commented that Maryland's current statute is broad enough 
to exempt spiritual advice or counseling from the reporting requirement. 
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 50, at 1146 n.85. 
98. Even in a House Floor Report, delegates acknowledged that the original 
law "unwittingly did away with the attorney-client privilege and the priest-
penitent privilege. This bill is intended to correct that oversight." See H.D. 
1490, 1998 Leg., 398th Sess. (Md. 1988), microfarmed on 276/C-312 (Md. 
Dep't of Legis. Reference). 
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tions to a minister, clergyman, or priest."99 Religious organizations 
might read "certain communications" to include almost any commu-
nication between a clergyman and a member. 
The Catholic Church has taken its own steps towards clarifying 
which communications should be reported. For instance, the United 
States Conference of Bishops released a new policy in 2002 that man-
dated all church officials "comply with all applicable civil laws."lOo 
This clarification does not provide much guidance, however, if the 
state laws are ambiguous. The Washington Archdiocese in the District 
of Columbia outlined in its Child Protection Policy that personnel 
shall report suspected abuse to appropriate authorities unless that in-
formation is "subject to the priest-penitent privilege." 101 Unfortu-
nately, the Policy fails to define the priest-penitent privilege, leaving 
room for a broad interpretation of the exception. The bill proposed 
in Maryland in 2003 would have solved these problems. 
IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Although Maryland's proposed amendments to the child abuse re-
porting statute failed in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee in 
2003 and 2004, likely because of intense pressure from several relig-
ious groups,102 the legislature should not back down. As Senator 
Delores G. Kelley pointed out, an amendment like that in 2003 
"would serve the interests of Maryland's children, providing increased 
protection when it is most needed."103 The bill was designed to limit 
the current exemption and eliminate confusion as to which communi-
cations will remain exempted. 104 In particular, it was aimed at "clergy 
who confer between and among themselves and/or others regarding 
how to protect the public, legal, or fiscal position of their religious 
99. 
100. 
80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 130 (1995). 
Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the Protec-
tion of Children and Young People, Revised Edition (Nov. 2002), available 
at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htrn. See Child Safety Vs. Clergy 
Rights, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2002, at 14A; see also The Bishops and the Law, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 10,2002, at B6. 
101. Press Release, Archdiocese of Washington, Child Protection Policy (Mar. 
2003), available at http://www.adw.org/commun/cpp_english.pdf. 
102. See Becker, supra note 30, at B3. Members of the Senate Committee on 
Judicial Proceedings received emotional letters and testimony from constit-
uents opposing the bill. See id.; see also Letter from Elizabeth A. Konig to 
Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee (Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with author) (stating that "[i]f the 'seal of 
confession' is broken, as in [Senate Bill] 412 and [House Bill] 823 now 
before the Maryland legislature, this ancient comity between the Catholic 
103. 
104. 
Church and the State of Maryland will be violated"). 
Family Law-Child Abuse and Neglect-Reporting try Members of Clergy: Hearing on 
S.B. 412 Before the Senate judicial Proceedings Comm., 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. 
(Md. Feb. 25, 2003) (testimony of Sen. Delores G. Kelley) (on file with 
author). 
[d. 
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institution, in light of a suspected or acknowledged case of child 
abuse."105 These are all compelling reasons for the Maryland legisla-
ture to pass a bill similar to Senate Bill 412. 
A. Language of the 2003 Proposed Bill 
Senate Bill 412 elucidated exactly which types of communications 
must be reported to authorities, creating a bright-line rule for relig-
ious leaders. 106 It would have required all communications other 
105. Id. 
106. SeeS. 412,2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003). As introduced, Senate Bill 412 
read as follows: 
(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsec-
tion, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including a law on 
privileged communications, a person in this state other than a 
health practitioner, police officer, or educator or human service 
worker who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to 
abuse or neglect shall: 
(i) if the person has reason to believe the child has been subjected 
to neglect, notify the local department or the appropriate law en-
forcement agency; or 
(ii) if the person has reason to believe the child has been subjected 
to neglect, notify the local department. 
(2) A person is not required to provide notice under paragraph (1) 
of this subsection: 
(i) in violation of the privilege described under § 9-108 of the 
Courts Article; 
(ii) if the notice would disclose matter communicated in confi-
dence by a client to the client's attorney or other information relat-
ing to the representation of the client; or 
(iii) in violation of any constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 
(3) (I) A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an estab-
lished church of any denomination is not required to provide no-
tice under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the notice would 
disclose matter in Felation W any EOFHmuniEation desEribed in § 9 
III of the COUFts l'\Ftiele and: 
(i) the EommuniEation was made to tHe FHinisteF,eleFg}'man, OF 
pFiest in a pFofessional EHaFaEteF in tHe EOUFSe of disEipline en 
joined by tHe EHUFEH to 'n'HiEH tHe ministeF, eleFgyman, OF priest 
belongs; and 
W COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE 
COURSE OF A CONFESSION, AND the minister, clergyman, or 
priest is SPECIFICALLY bound to maintain the confidentiality of 
that communication under canon law, OR church doctrine, or 
practice. 
(II) SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH MAY NOT BE 
CONSTRUED TO MODIFY OR LIMIT THE DUTY TO REPORT 
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT: 
1. WHENEVER A MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST DE-
SCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH ACTS 
IN A CAPACITY THAT WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE THE 
MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST TO REPORT SUSPECTED 
ABUSE OR NEGLECT UNDER THIS SUBTITLE; OR 
2. IF INFORMATION REGARDING THE SUSPECTED ABUSE OR 
NEGLECT: 
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than confessions or similar communications of the perpetrator to be 
reported. 107 
The bill deleted the confusing language found in current subsec-
tion (a) (3) (i)-"communication ... in the course of discipline en-
joined by the church"-and instead added language that limits the 
exception to confessions of the perpetrator. 108 By using the word 
"confession," the bill probably would have limited the exemption to 
communications made during the Roman Catholic Sacrament of Pen-
ance or similar practices. 109 While the bill retained the requirement 
that the clergyman be bound to maintain the confidentiality of the 
communication under canon law or church doctrine, the bill clarified 
that such confidentiality must be specifically required. 110 The bill also 
deleted the word "practice" from current subsection (a) (3)(I)(ii) .111 
Both of these changes would have made the exemption narrower and 
less ambiguous than the current law by ensuring that clergy act under 
specific church doctrine, rather than habit or custom, when deciding 
to keep communication confidential. 112 Finally, the bill included a 
subsection that listed circumstances in which the exception would not 
apply and the clergyman would be required to report. 1I3 
B. Public Policy Reasons Supporting the 2003 Proposed Bill 
Passage of a bill like Senate Bill 412 would promote sound public 
policy. While some may incorrectly argue that this bill offends the 
A. WAS OBTAINED FROM ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN BY THE 
PERPETRATOR IN THE COURSE OF A CONFESSION, INCLUD-
ING PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF A VICTIM, EVEN THOUGH 
INFORMATION ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE 
PERPETRATOR IN THE COURSE OF A CONFESSION; 
B. WAS COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE 
COURSE OF A CONFESSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A THIRD 
PARTY; OR 
C. WAS COMMUNICATED BY THE PERPETRATOR IN THE 
COURSE OF A CONFESSION AND DISCLOSED BY A MINISTER, 
PRIEST, OR CLERGYMAN DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH TO 
A THIRD PARTY. 
Id. The struck-through text would be deleted from MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAw § 5-705 (2002). The text in all capital letters would be added. 
107. See id. 
108. See supra note 106. 
109. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. While this language probably 
encompassed certain communications with clergy from churches outside 
the Catholic faith, the bill might have benefited from changing the word 
"confession" to "confidential penitential communication" to more clearly 
indicate this point. Such language was used in the 2004 version of the bill. 
See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra note 106. 
111. See supra note 106. 
112. See supra note 106. 
113. See supra note 106. 
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clergy-communicant privilege,l14 Maryland law has traditionally only 
recognized the privilege in the context of court proceedings.115 The 
privilege does not extend to other situations outside of court, includ-
ing the reporting of suspected child abuse. 116 By removing a cross-
reference to the clergy-communicant privilege, confusion regarding 
the scope of the exemption would be eliminated. Furthermore, a 
clergyman making a child abuse report would be guaranteed confi-
dentiality,117 and could still invoke the clergy-communicant privilege 
during subsequent court proceedings. 118 
Additionally, the spirit of the confessional would not be dishon-
ored, because the bill would still exempt true "confessions" of sin. 119 
Perpetrators would be encouraged to speak with their priests, minis-
ters, or rabbis, because they would not fear being reported to authori-
ties. 120 Therefore, open communications and the potential resolution 
of problems would still be fostered.1 21 
On the other hand, communications made by victims of abuse or 
third parties are not "confessions" at all, because those children did 
not commit a sin. Children may be simply reaching out to someone 
they trust for help and guidance, most likely because they feel uncom-
fortable reporting the abuse themselves. 122 Clergy should be responsi-
ble for taking that step for them, instead of perpetuating feelings of 
114. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
115. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2003). 
116. Id. The statute states only that a minister, priest, or rabbi "may not be com-
pelled to testify" regarding confidential communications. See supra note 87. 
See also Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore 
School of Law, to Senator Brian Frosh, Chairman of the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee (Feb. 20, 2003) (on file with author). In this let-
ter, McLain points out that "[Senate Bill] 412 does not address in-court 
testimony. Rather, it imposes a legal obligation to make an out-of-court 
report. The exception it carves out from that duty must be as narrowly 
defined as possible, or the reporting requirement will be totally gutted." Id. 
117. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-707 (2004). 
118. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2002). 
119. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Studies show that victims of child 
sexual abuse very rarely report it themselves. 
121. One supporter of Senate Bill 412 has pointed out that, even if the bill re-
quired clergy to report perpetrators' confessions, perpetrators would not 
necessarily be discouraged from communicating with clergy. See Family Law 
- Child Abuse and Neglect - Reporting by Members of Clergy: Hearing on S.B. 412 
Before the Senate judicial Proceedings Comm., 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. Feb. 
25, 2003) (testimony of Ellen Mugmon) (on file with author). She sug-
gested that research shows trust, and not necessarily confidentiality, is what 
fosters a therapeutic relationship. Id. Therefore, if a clergyman informs a 
confessor up front that a report could potentially be made, the confessor 
may still disclose the abuse. See id. 
122. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. This would provide "increased 
protection when it is most needed" by the state's children. See supra note 
103 and accompanying text. See also JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 18, at 13-
14. 
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guilt and suggesting that it is acceptable to keep abuse secret. While 
some may argue that if a child does not wish to report the abuse, the 
clergyman should honor that desire, the State's interest in prosecut-
ing child abusers should outweigh the victim's interest in privacy.123 
The bill also clarifies situations in which clergy are specifically 
bound to report. 124 First, they must report abuse if it was disclosed to 
them by a third person as well as by the perpetrator. 125 In this way, 
the clergyman would not be reporting the perpetrator's confession, 
but rather the third party's disclosure of abuse, of which the clergy-
man was already aware.126 As Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, 
Kathryn M. Rowe, stated, "[i]t should not be open to a defendant to 
remove possible sources of information about his or her crimes simply 
by confessing to them."127 
Second, a third party's presence during the perpetrator's confes-
sion would break the duty of confidentiality and require a report to be 
made, as would the clergyman's disclosure of the confession to any 
other third person. 128 This parallels the evidentiary privilege, which 
both federal and state courts have found to be inapplicable when in-
formation is disclosed in the presence of a third party. 1 29 Therefore, a 
clergyman would not be able to discuss a perpetrator's confession of 
child sexual abuse with his colleagues without invoking the duty to 
report. 130 
Third, the exemption would not apply any time the clergyman was 
acting outside the capacity of priest, minister, or rabbi when hearing 
123. See infra note 177 (discussing a California case that found a state's interest 
in the apprehension of felons and prevention of child abuse are "compel-
ling" for purposes of constitutional analysis). 
124. See supra note 106. 
12S. See supra note 106. 
126. See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to 
Maryland Senator Delores G. Kelley (Jan. 20, 2004) (on file with author). 
127. [d. 
128. See supra note 106. 
129. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 61S F.2d 828, 828 (9th Cir. 1980) (prisoner 
confessed to chaplain in front of officer); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 829 
(La. 1975) (defendant told minister of crimes while two other people were 
present). While Maryland courts have never decided if a clergyman may 
waive the privilege by making a disclosure to a third party, such a principle 
is in line with other states' interpretation of the privilege. See, e.g., State v. 
Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 836 (NJ. 1994) (holding that the privilege could be 
waived by a clergyman without the consent of the communicant). Also, as 
Professor McLain points out, the language of the statute itself-"[a] minis-
ter, [priest, or rabbi] ... may not be compelled"-implies that the clergy-
man holds the privilege and his disclosure to a third party will waive it. See 
Letter from Professor McLain, supra note 116. 
130. This section of the bill ensures clergy do not secretly "confer between and 
among themselves and/or others regarding how to protect the public, le-
gal, or fiscal position of their religious institution." See supra text accompa-
nying note lOS. 
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of the abuse. I31 For example, if the clergyman learned of abuse while 
coaching the church basketball team or attending a neighborhood 
picnic, the duty to report would attach. In those instances, the church 
member probably does not have an expectation that the communica-
tion will be kept secret and the communication does not rise to the 
level of a religiously compelled "confession." 
Not only does the bill clarify exactly which information is not ex-
empted, it also provides an avenue for clergy that would like to report 
sexual abuse, but fear violating church law. I32 The few churches that 
punish clergy for revealing confidential information would have to tol-
erate adherence to a generally applicable law of the government. I33 
In fact, many churches may approve of the requirement because, by 
making child abuse reporting mandatory, the statute prevents the re-
port from constituting a waiver of the privilege at a subsequent 
trial. I34 Waiver of an evidentiary privilege occurs only when the 
holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses information to a third 
person. I35 
This bill would also correct a bizarre incongruity in the law that 
requires psychotherapists to report child abuse, but exempts clergy 
from the same dUty.136 Maryland law recognizes both a clergy-com-
municant and psychotherapist-patient privilege for in-court testi-
131. See supra note 106. 
132. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
133. A California appellate court has found that, where a priest was dismissed 
from service in retaliation for reporting another priest's sexual abuse of a 
child, judicial review of the priest's claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and defamation was appropriate. Conley v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of S.F., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 683 (2000). Clergy would also be 
immune from civil liability for making the report, so long as it was done in 
good faith. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-708 (2004). 
134. See Letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore 
School of Law, to Senator Brian E. Frosh, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings 
Committee (Mar. 4, 2004) (on file with author). 
135. See Letter from Professor McLain, supra note 116. 
136. The statute exempts only communications protected by the attorney-client 
and c1ergy-communicant privileges. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 
(2004). It previously contained an exemption for certain communications 
between a psychotherapist and patient (known as the "Berlin exemption"), 
but that exemption was repealed in 1989. See 1989 Md. Laws 730. Interest-
ingly, one of the reasons for repealing the exemption was that therapy does 
not cure pedophilia, so encouraging child molesters to seek treatment 
would not actually solve their problem. See H.D. 1210, 1989 Leg., 384 Sess. 
(Md. 1989), micro/armed on 276/C-328 (Md. Dept. of Legis. Reference). 
One could argue that the c1ergy-communicant privilege should also be re-
pealed in its entirety because encouraging molesters to confide in clergy 
will not stop them from abusing children. The other reason for repealing 
the psychotherapist-patient exemption was that abusers do not seek treat-
ment voluntarily, but only when there is a threat of disclosure if they do 
not. Therefore, removing the exemption would not decrease the number 
of abusers seeking voluntary treatment. See H.D. 1210, 1989 Leg., 384 Sess. 
(Md. 1989), micro/armed on 276/C-328 (Md. Dept. of Legis. Reference). 
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mony.I37 While many of the reasons supporting the extension of 
these privileges to child abuse reporting are the same for both groups, 
the law reaches different results. In both cases, a privilege was created 
to encourage open communications and the resolution of 
problems. I38 If the legislature has determined that requiring psycho-
therapists to report is so important to the public safety as to warrant 
severing a confidential relationship, why has it not done the same for 
clergy?I39 Critics of the bill may argue that it would violate the clergy's 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. As discussed be-
low, however, this argument lacks support in the law. I40 
C. The 2004 Version oj the Bill 
The version of the bill introduced in the Senate in 2004 was modi-
fied to allow clergy to keep many communications confidential. 141 
137. The psychotherapist-patient privilege is found in MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (2002). 
138. See, e.g., McCormack v. Bd. of Educ. of Bait. County, 158 Md. App. 292, 305-
06, 857 A.2d 159, 167 (2004) (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, the court stated that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede 
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treat-
ment"). See al50 J. Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-
Penitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMBo L. REv. 681, 689 
(1997-98). 
139. Other scholars have recognized the need for uniformity in this area. 
O'Malley, supra note 79, at 713 (stating that "[m]andatory child abuse re-
porting statutes guarantee that there is equal treatment across the board 
for professionals who generally assert a privilege"). For a thorough discus-
sion of the disparity between the treatment of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege and the clergy-communicant privilege in child abuse reporting 
statutes, see Keel, supra note 138. 
140. See infra Part IV. 
141. S. 237, 2004 Leg., 418th Sess. (Md. 2004); H.D. 1098,2004 Leg., 418th Sess. 
(Md. 2004). In pertinent part, the modified bill read as follows: 
(3) (I) A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an estab-
lished church of any denomination is not required to provide no-
tice under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the notice would 
disclose matter iH relausH ts aHY eSffiffiuHieatisH aeserisea iH § 9 
111 sf the Gsurts Mude aHa COMMUNICATED TO THE MINIS-
TER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST IN THE COURSE OF A CONFI-
DENTIAL PENITENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND: 
1. THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST IS SPECIFICALLY 
BOUND TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALI1Y OF THAT 
COMMUNICATION UNDER CANON LAW OR CHURCH DOC-
TRINE; AND 
2. the communication was made to the minister, clergyman, or 
priest in a professional character in the course of discipline en-
joined by the church to which the minister, clergyman, or priest 
belongs[; and the minister, clergyman, or priest is bound to main-
tain the confidentiality of that communication under canon law, 
church doctrine, or practice].; aHa the ffiiHister, derg},fflaH, sr 
priest is ssuHa ts ffiaiHtaiH the eSHfiaeHtiality sf that eSffiffiUHiea 
tiSH uHaer eaHSH la''<\', ehureh asetriHe, or praetiee. 
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While not as effective as the 2003 version of the bill,142 it still would 
have been a huge victory in the protection of children. 
This bill differed from Senate Bill 412 of 2003 because it would have 
exempted clergy from reporting information learned from anyone 
during confidential penitential communications,143 rather than con-
fessions of the perpetrator only.144 The phrase "confidential peniten-
tial communications" is somewhat unclear, but probably includes 
Roman Catholic confessions and similar practices in other churches. 
The bill also differed from Senate Bill 412 of 2003 by retaining the 
confusing phrase "in the course of discipline enjoined by the church" 
found in the current statute. 145 
The bill was similar to Senate Bill 412 of 2003, in that it also in-
cluded language that clarified when clergy must report. Clergy would 
still have been required to report if they learned of the abuse when 
acting in a capacity other than that of a clergyman, thereby rendering 
the clergy-communicant relationship inapplicable. 146 Clergy would 
have been required to report abuse they learned about from any 
source other than a confidential penitential communication.147 The 
bill specifically provided that personal observations must be re-
ported. 148 Finally, any time a confession was made in the presence of 
Id. 
(II) SUBPARAGRAPH (I) OF THIS PARAGRAPH MAY NOT BE 
CONSTRUED TO MODIFY OR LIMIT THE DUTY TO REPORT 
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT: 
l. WHENEVER A MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST OF AN 
ESTABLISHED CHURCH OF ANY DENOMINATION FUNC-
TIONS IN A ROLE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE THE 
MINSTER, CLERGYMAN, OR PRIEST TO REPORT SUSPECTED 
ABUSE OR NEGLECT UNDER THIS SUBTITLE; OR 
2. IF INFORMATION REGARDING THE SUSPECTED ABUSE OR 
NEGLECT: 
A. WAS OBTAINED IN ANY MANNER OTHER THAN AS DE-
SCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS PARAGRAPH, IN-
CLUDING PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF A VICTIM, EVEN 
THOUGH INFORMATION ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN OBTAINED 
AS DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS PARAGRAPH; 
B. WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, 
OR PRIEST IN THE PRESENCE OF A THIRD PERSON; OR 
C. WAS DISCLOSED BY THE MINISTER, CLERGYMAN, OR 
PRIEST TO A THIRD PERSON. 
142. In fact, Kathryn Rowe pointed out that the bill may not substantively 
change the current law at all, but may simply provide clearer language. See 
Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, supra note 126. 
143. See supra note 14l. 
144. See supra note 14l. 
145. See supra note 14l. 
146. See supra note 14l. 
147. See supra note 14l. 
148. See supra note 14l. 
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a third party or the clergyman revealed abuse to a third person, the 
broken confidentiality would have required a report to be made. 149 
The bill, while lacking the bright-line rule that all information other 
than a perpetrator's confession must be reported, still aimed to dis-
courage clergy from conferring among themselves and choosing to 
deal with allegations of abuse within the church.I50 It also clarified 
the instances in which clergy must report. 15I However, the bill would 
not have adequately protected victims and family members who tell 
clergy about the abuse during a "confession."152 In these situations, 
the clergyman would have no duty to report. 153 
Like critics of Senate Bill 412 of 2003, critics of the 2004 bill may 
argue that requiring clergy to report child abuse in some circum-
stances violates the clergy's constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion. As the following section explains, such a law would be well 
within the boundaries of the United States Constitution. 
v. CONSTITUTIONALI1Y OF A MANDATORY REPORTING LAW 
A child abuse reporting statute that includes clergy as mandated 
reporters would not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. 154 The United States Supreme Court will uphold gener-
ally applicable state laws that infringe only incidentally upon a per-
son's religious beliefs. I55 In fact, a reporting law that creates a broad 
exemption for clergy may conflict with the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. I56 A court might find that such an exemption 
improperly promotes religion. I57 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
State laws applicable to the public in general, and not aimed specifi-
cally at religious groups, will not violate the Free Exercise Clause. In 
1940, the Supreme Court noted that "[c]onscientious scruples have 
not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved 
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the pro-
149. See supra note 141. 
150. See supra note 141. 
151. See supra note 141. 
152. See supra note 141. 
153. See supra note 141. 
154. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." [d. The First Amendment is applica-
ble to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. U.S. Const. amend XIV; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
303 (1940). 
155. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text. 
156. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
157. See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text. 
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motion or restriction of religious beliefs."158 The Court reiterated this 
principle in its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 159 when it 
found that a neutral law of general applicability-one that criminal-
ized the use of narcotics, including the sacramental use of peyote-
was valid. 160 
The Court in Smith went on to hold that the government does not 
need to show a compelling interest in order for the Court to uphold a 
generally applicable law affecting an individual's religious beliefs.161 
The Court noted that such a rule "would open the prospect of consti-
tutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of al-
most every conceivable kind."162 
Congress attempted to abrogate this holding in Smith when it 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) .163 
The statute's stated purpose was "to restore the compelling interest 
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963) ... and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened."164 However, the Supreme Court responded 
to RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,165 when it held the statute was un-
constitutional as applied to state government action.166 The Court 
pointed out that Congress had overstepped its bounds and violated 
the separation of powers by enacting RFRA.167 Therefore, the Smith 
test still applies to most Free Exercise challenges. 168 
158. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940). 
159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
160. Id. at 878-82. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 888. 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2003). 
164. Id. The balancing test in Sherbert set forth that governmental actions sub-
stantially burdening religious practices must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). 
This test was applied where unemployment benefits were denied based on 
an individualized consideration of whether an employee had either quit work, 
or not accepted work, for "good cause." See id. at 400-01. Smith held that 
such a test applied only to a very narrow field of factual situations like the 
one in Sherbert. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85. 
165. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 536. 
168. There are still two instances when a compelling interest test will apply to 
challenges of statutes affecting religious beliefs. One occurs in situations 
where free exercise is affected by individualized considerations, as in Sher-
bert. See supra note 164. The second, known as a "hybrid-rights" violation, 
occurs when a statute infringes upon not only freedom of religion, but also 
upon some other constitutionally protected interest. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 
881. One author has attempted to argue that mandating clergy to report 
child abuse violates both the free exercise rights of the confessor as well as 
the free exercise rights of the church. See Merlino, supra note 40, at 697. 
However, the Smith court points out that it has only found a generally appli-
cable law to violate the Free Exercise Clause when it also violated freedom 
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Senate Bill 412 would certainly pass muster under the principles set 
forth in Smith. Like the statute in Smith, which prohibited the know-
ing or intentional possession of a controlled substance, 1 69 a 
mandatory child abuse reporting statute is a law of general applicabil-
ity. It is a law requiring every citizen in the State of Maryland to pro-
tect children by reporting suspected child abuse to the authorities. 170 
It is not aimed at restricting religious beliefs, but instead at ensuring 
the health and welfare of children. 171 
Even if a court were to apply the compelling interest test to Senate 
Bill 412, the law would be upheld. As the Supreme Court set forth in 
1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts,I72 the government has an interest in 
the protection of children sufficient to outweigh sacred religious in-
terests. I73 In 1982, the Court noted in New York v. Ferber that "[i]t is 
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 
'compelling."'174 Therefore, Maryland's proposed bill, which aims to 
protect the welfare of children,I75 would be beyond the reach of any 
First Amendment argument. I76 It serves the compelling government 
interest of protecting children. 
There have been no reported constitutional challenges to state stat-
utes requiring clergy to report confessional communications. A Cali-
fornia state court, however, has already decided the constitutionality 
of a mandatory reporting statute that specifically exempts confessional 
communications. I77 The court decided that California's law, which 
mandates reports of information learned from any communication 











of speech or the press, or the right of parents to direct the education of 
their children. Smith, 494 U.S. at 88l. 
Id. at 874. The individuals challenging the statute claimed that denial of 
unemployment benefits based on their sacramental use of peyote violated 
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. 
Senate Bill 412 requires, with limited exceptions, "any person" to report 
suspected abuse. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Court upheld a parent's conviction for 
permitting an infant to work in violation of state law, and rejected the par-
ent's claim that the law violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 168-69. 
Id. at 165-66. 
458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
One scholar has even hypothesized that abolition of the privilege for all 
purposes would be constitutional under a Smith analysis. John J. Montone, 
III, In Search of Forgiveness: State v. Szemple and the Priest-Penitent Privilege in 
Newjersey, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 263, 281-82 (1995). 
See People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 
1992). This case was followed in Conley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
S.F., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (2000), discussed supra at note 133. 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (West Supp. 2005); Hodges, 13 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 420. 
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"the mere fact that a petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a 
governmental program does not mean an exception . . . must be 
granted," and that if the petitioners were exempt from reporting, "the 
[reporting requirement] 's purpose would be severely under-
mined."179 The court also believed the state's interests in the appre-
hension of felons and prevention of child abuse were compelling. 180 
Therefore, Maryland's child abuse reporting statute might also be 
deemed constitutionally valid. Simply because Senate Bill 412 inci-
dentally burdens the religious practices of some clergy does not mean 
it is unconstitutional. Also, it would serve the same compelling state 
interests that the California law now serves. In fact, without removing 
the clergy exemption from the current Maryland law, the law may vio-
late another constitutional provision found in the First Amendment-
the Establishment Clause. 
B. The Establishment Clause 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Establishment 
Clause requires that 
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can 
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion. I81 
This interpretation is vital to the continued separation of church and 
state. A child abuse reporting statute, with a religious exemption af-
fecting the health and welfare of children, can be viewed as an imper-
missible attempt to aid religion. It is not a neutral statute, but one 
expressly providing that some citizens are not required to comply be-
cause of their religious practices.182 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,183 the Supreme Court established a three-part 
test for use in determining whether a statute violates the Establish-
ment Clause. 184 The Court held that the statute first must have a "sec-
ular legislative purpose."185 Second, its "principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."186 Finally, 
"the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement 
179. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420. 
180. Id. at 419. 
181. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
182. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (2004). 
183. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
184. Id. at 612-13. 
185. Id. at 612. 
186. Id. 
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with religion.' "187 Maryland courts have followed this approach quite 
strictly, particularly in cases involving children. 
In Davis v. State,188 the Court of Appeals of Maryland cautioned that 
any religious exemption potentially affecting the health and welfare of 
children should be carefully scrutinized under Establishment Clause 
principles. 189 In that case, a parent challenged a religious exemption 
from a law requiring school children to be immunized. 190 He argued 
that the exemption, which applied only to conflicts with the tenets of 
recognized churches or religious denominations, should apply to con-
flicts with personal beliefs. 191 The court, in ruling that the exemption 
did not include personal beliefs, also found the exemption unconsti-
tutional under the Establishment Clause. 192 
Applying the principles of Lemon and Davis to Maryland's current 
reporting law confirms that it may be invalid. While it is true that the 
exemption may have the secular legislative purpose of encouraging 
open communications and the resolution of the abuser's problems,193 
its principal effect is to advance religion. 194 Permitting clergy to keep 
confessions of abuse secret usually does not resolve the problem, but 
instead allows the abuser to continue molesting children. 195 There-
fore, the statute's principal effect is not to resolve problems, but to 
allow religious institutions to exacerbate them. This type of exemp-
tion probably constitutes "excessive entanglement," which the Su-
preme Court has proscribed. 196 A Maryland court might, therefore, 
find the current reporting law as an unconstitutional attempt to ad-
vance religion, especially given that it involves the health and welfare 
of children. 
As well as advancing religion in general, the statute appears to favor 
one religion over another. If the statute were read to protect only 
confessional communications, it would apply only to those religions 
that practice confession. 197 The Supreme Court has held that such 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny.198 Therefore, the state must have a 
compelling interest for the discrimination, and the law must be 
187. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970». 
188. 294 Md. 370, 451 A.2d 107 (1982). 
189. Id. at 378-79,451 A.2d at 111-12. 
190. Id. at 374,451 A.2d at 109. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 382,451 A.2d at 114. 
193. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra note 18. 
196. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 56-59. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text (com-
menting that Senate Bill 412 might benefit from an amendment 
that changes the word "confession" to "confidential penitential 
communications") . 
198. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). 
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"closely fitted" to that interest. 199 In the case of a child abuse report-
ing statute, there can be no conceivable state interest in preferring 
one religion over another. There is no legitimate reason to allow 
some religions to keep abuse secret, while others must report it to 
authorities. 
Because of these constitutional concerns, it is imperative that the 
Maryland legislature pass a child abuse reporting statute that does not 
include an impermissible exemption for clergy. Maryland must pass a 
bill like Senate Bill 412. In addition to a law that strengthens Mary-
land's child abuse reporting statute, there are other laws that could be 
created to better protect the state's children. 
VI. OTHER LAWS 
Maryland has done much in the way of protecting children from 
sexual abuse. The Maryland legislature recently adopted a new sen-
tencing guideline for the sexual abuse of children.20o Any person 
convicted of sexual abuse of a minor may receive up to the maximum 
sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment.201 Another bill recently 
passed by the Maryland legislature affects the statute of limitations for 
victims wishing to bring civil suits against their abusers.202 Victims 
may now bring suit until seven years after they reach the age of major-
ity.203 These laws are proper steps towards holding child abusers re-
sponsible for their actions. Maryland is one of few states, however, 
with no criminal penalty for failing to report suspected child abuse.204 
Some legislators are attempting to pass a bill that would make fail-
ing to report sexual abuse a misdemeanor for health practitioners, 
police officers, educators, and human service workers.205 The penalty 
would be a $1,000 fine. 206 In 2004, a similar bill was successful in the 
Maryland Senate, but did not pass in the House.207 The bill needs to 
199. Id. at 246-47. 
200. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-602 (2002). 
201. Id. at § 3-602(c). This law should be strictly enforced. Only two percent of 
priests and deacons accused of child sexual abuse have served prison 
sentences. JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 18, at xii. 
202. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-117 (Supp. 2004). This law is neces-
sary because victims of child abuse often are reluctant to come forward willi 
information of abuse until many years after it has occurred. See supra notes 
19-20. 
203. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-l.i7. Legislators are now attempting 
to increase the limitations period to twenty-eight years after the age of ma-
jority. See H.D. 1376, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005). 
204. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (Supp. 2004). An advisory opinion of 
the Maryland Attorney General points out that the duty to report is 
mandatory, despite the lack of a penalty for failure to report. 60 Op. Md. 
Att'y Gen. 51 (1975). 
205. See S. 106, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005); H.D. 845, 2005 Leg., 420th 
Sess. (Md. 2005). 
206. Id. 
207. See S. 195, 2003 Leg., 417th Sess. (Md. 2003). 
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be passed, and extended to include penalties for all persons failing to 
report. Simply requiring people to report, without providing a pen-
alty for failure to do so, is ineffective. 
Recently in Ohio, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cincinnati 
became the first diocese in the United States to be penalized for fail-
ing to report sexual 'abuse of children.208 The judge, imposing the 
maximum fine of $2,000 on each of the five counts, commented that 
he believed "everybody has the duty to follow the law."209 He further 
expressed disappointment that the religious leaders had failed their 
moral duty to report serious crimes against children, placing "self-
preservation" as their highest priority.210 
Many other states have criminal penalties for failure to report child 
abuse or neglect. The extent of the penalty varies by state. Tennes-
see, for example, treats failure to report as a misdemeanor, and pro-
vides a maximum fine of fifty dollars if the defendant pleads guilty.211 
In contrast, Mississippi punishes those who violate its reporting law by 
a fine up to $5,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both.212 Other 
states take more creative approaches. For instance, Illinois treats the 
first violation of its reporting statute as a misdemeanor, and the sec-
ond as a felony.213 Additionally, physicians or dentists that violate the 
law will be referred to their disciplinary boards.214 
Maryland should also create, as other states have done, an express 
provision for civil liability when clergy fail to report suspected child 
abuse. The law currently does not provide for a civil cause of action, 
but creating one would further encourage clergymen to report sus-
pected abuse.215 Such a cause of action would also provide relief to 
those injured by the clergy's failure to report. 
208. Alan Cooperman, Archdiocese Fined in Abuse Coverup, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 
2003, at A3. Surprisingly, no other religious leaders have been convicted. 
This is true even in Texas, a state with very strict child abuse reporting 
requirements. See supra note 82. 
209. Cooperman, supra note 208, at A3. 
210. Id. 
211. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-412 (Supp. 2001). 
212. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353(7) (Supp.2004). 
213. 325 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/4.02 (West Supp. 2004). 
214. Id. 
215. Although Maryland does not expressly allow a civil cause of action for fail-
ure to report child abuse, a private plaintiff may still make out a claim for 
negligence. See Bentley V. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 325-26, 734 A.2d 697, 705 
(1999) (holding that, although Maryland's (now superceded) Child Abuse 
Act did not impose criminal or civil liability for failure to report child 
abuse, violation of the statute "may furnish evidence of negligence ... 'if 
the person alleging negligence is within the class of persons sought to be 
protected, and the harm suffered is of the kind which the statute was in-
tended, in general, to prevent"') (citing Atlantic Mutual V. Kenney, 323 
Md. 116, 124,591 A.2d 507,510-11 (1991». Even though private plaintiffs 
may have a claim in negligence, a statutory cause of action would put citi-
zens on notice that the duty to report is serious and could result in personal 
liability. Such a statute might read: "Any person who knowingly violates the 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland legislature must take action to protect the children of 
the state. Sexual abuse by clergy has run rampant, and secrecy within 
religious institutions has exacerbated the harm done.216 As Mary-
land's current child abuse reporting statute exempts clergy from re-
porting anything that would fall within the clergy-communicant 
privilege,217 it should be amended to require clergy to report all sus-
pected instances of child abuse. Such a law would be constitutional 
under the Free Exercise Clause, and would put to rest any Establish-
ment Clause concerns the current law creates.218 Finally, in order for 
the law to be fully effective, Maryland must create penalties for failure 
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provisions of § 5-705 shall be liable for civil damages proximately caused 
thereby." Cf COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West Supp. 2004). 
See discussion supra Part I. 
See discussion supra Part III. 
See discussion supra Part IV. 
See discussion supra Part V. 
